



# Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

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## P R E S S   R E L E A S E

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### CODEL Goss Visit to Baghdad

WASHINGTON, D.C.—Chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), Porter Goss (R-FL), Ranking Democrat Jane Harman (D-CA), and Congressmen Jim Gibbons (R-NV) and Robert “Bud” Cramer (D-AL) conducted a 3-day oversight mission focused on Iraq.

The delegation also held related meetings with U.S. personnel in Cairo, Egypt; Amman, Jordan; and Rome, Italy, to assess support for the US-led coalition’s military action in Iraq, as well as counterproliferation, counterterrorism, and force protection issues.

On July 10<sup>th</sup>, the CODEL met Coalition officials in Baghdad to review the efforts underway to determine the status of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction program and establish security in Iraq following Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Meetings and site visits included Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Administrator, Ambassador L. Paul Bremer; Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, commander of Coalition forces in Iraq; Dr. David Kay, Major General Keith Dayton (U.S. Army), and senior staff of the Iraq Survey Group; and operational personnel from across the Intelligence Community.

Upon its return to Washington, the delegation issued the following report:

#### AMBASSADOR BREMER AND THE COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY

- The CPA, under Ambassador Bremer’s direction, has a clear strategic plan, which is in full-swing, to rebuild Iraq and help the Iraqi people develop and sustain a free, open and democratic society. The delegation was impressed by reports that a broad cross-section of Iraqis are cooperating with US-led Coalition authorities, notwithstanding the violence being committed by former regime and foreign operatives engaged in insurgency and terrorist acts.
- Ambassador Bremer’s priorities include re-establishing security, restarting Iraq’s economy, and fostering Iraq’s political transformation. In these efforts, the CPA is supported by long-repressed Iraqis who understand that Iraq’s future lies in these directions, not in a return to the old regime or a turn towards religious extremism.

- The CPA's goal is a functioning, sovereign Iraqi government that represents all the people of Iraq. The delegation offered its full support for the CPA's efforts.

### **BAGHDAD'S SURVIVAL**

- While TV images of U.S. strikes on targets in Baghdad might convey the impression that Coalition forces destroyed large swaths of the city, the delegation's helicopter overflight of Baghdad established that the city's residential areas, roads, and bridges were largely spared destruction. The city, as a whole, was more adversely affected by the former regime's multiple decades of economic mismanagement, corruption, and brutality. The looting that followed the end of major combat operations also complicates the rebuilding process.

### **AMERICAN FORCES IN IRAQ**

- U.S. personnel throughout Iraq are performing heroically under extremely austere and dangerous conditions. The constant threat of violence, extreme temperatures, pervasive dust, lack of running water in some places, electricity outages, long separation from families, and communal living arrangements make for a very harsh environment.
- While U.S. personnel occupy a number of the former regime's sumptuous palaces, these facilities are only minimally functional. Gold-plated plumbing fails to provide sufficient water supply. Multiple chandeliers provide sporadic lighting, a result of aged power infrastructure as well as occasional sabotage activities of insurgent groups.
- Large numbers of U.S. troops are likely to remain in Iraq for years. In the near-term, they will be needed to extinguish an insurgency that threatens reconstruction efforts through acts of intimidation and sabotage. The possibility that this insurgency is being coordinated by elements of the former regime and/or by foreign elements cannot be ruled out. Furthermore, the presence of insurgent factions makes further Coalition casualties likely.

### **SECURITY AND SAFETY IN IRAQ**

- The Coalition is making good progress in re-establishing security in many parts of Iraq, especially in the north, south, and west. Nonetheless, the triangle between Baghdad, Tikrit, and Ramadi remains a dangerous, violent region. The majority of attacks on Coalition forces are occurring in that area.
- While other areas in Iraq are relatively secure, political transformation as a whole is being slowed by an atmosphere of fear among ordinary Iraqis that the old regime may yet re-emerge. The delegation concluded that confirming that Saddam and his two sons are dead or otherwise captured and prosecuted for crimes against humanity will significantly enhance the security situation throughout Iraq, as well as assist in determining the status of Iraq's WMD programs.

### **THE SEARCH FOR WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION**

- Dr. David Kay, General Dayton, the Iraq Survey Group and other dedicated Intelligence Community professionals have now brought an appropriate sense of urgency to the task of determining the status of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program and the various components that made up that capability.

- In carrying out this task, Dr. Kay's and General Dayton's team must unravel over two decades of Iraqi-regime efforts to obfuscate and hide its chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons and missile programs.
- The delegation noted that, after 1981, no WMD program in Iraq was initiated without a fully developed denial and deception program to shield the regime's activities.
- Additionally, based on its discussions with Dr. Kay and General Dayton, the delegation believes that the manner in which Saddam's regime carried out its WMD program was unlike other state-run WMD programs with which the US Intelligence Community was familiar.
- The dispersed nature of the regime's WMD activities makes the search now for the remnants of that program that much more complicated to sort out and verify.
- These efforts will also have to overcome the ongoing violence in Iraq, as noted; the uncertainties about the status and whereabouts of Saddam Hussein and his sons; and the intimidation of ordinary Iraqis by former regime officials.
- Dr. Kay and General Dayton reported that the Iraq Survey Group is not lacking for leads related to Iraq's WMD programs. These leads are being aggressively pursued. Bits of evidence of these programs are slowly emerging. Dr. Kay and General Dayton encouraged the delegation to be patient in this regard.
- Unraveling the status of Iraq's WMD program, according to Dr. Kay and General Dayton, will require, among other things, translating and reviewing approximately 7 ½ miles of captured documents believed to relate to various aspects of the regime's WMD activities. Of primary importance, it is now focusing on the capture and interrogation of knowledgeable Iraqis involved in such programs.
- Thus far, the evidence emerging on Iraq's WMD programs does not point to the existence of large stockpiles of chemical or biological weapons. While such stockpiles may eventually be found, Dr. Kay and General Dayton both noted that the Intelligence Community's assumptions about Iraq's WMD programs were largely based on fragmentary information collected over the past decade without any particularized insight into that closed society.
- The delegation expressed deep concern that the Intelligence Community's lack of Arabic speakers and interrogation specialists is hampering its ability to gather intelligence relating to WMD. Despite several years of prodding by the House Intelligence Committee, the Intelligence Community's failure to add additional Arabic language and interrogation capabilities is now having a seriously negative impact on a matter of utmost national importance.

### **WHAT'S NEXT**

In connection with its continuing review of pre-war intelligence on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and ties to terrorism, the Committee intends to hold a public hearing on July 24, 2003. More details to follow.

The focus of the hearing will be on the sufficiency of the intelligence and whether the Intelligence Community had the types of collection capabilities available to provide the right kind of intelligence regarding Iraq.

The witnesses anticipated to testify before the Committee next week likely will include several former Directors of Central Intelligence and individuals familiar with the resource and capability requirements of the Intelligence Community.

The Committee and its staff are in the process of reviewing the 20 volumes of documents provided to the Committee by the DCI regarding the intelligence assessment on Iraq's WMD program. The DCI has also responded by letter to the Committee's request of May 22. The DCI has been asked to produce an unclassified version of his response.

The Committee's staff will also engage in a series of interviews of various Intelligence Community personnel relating to the analytical judgments on Iraq's WMD program and Iraq's links to terrorist groups.

In its review of pre-war intelligence, the Committee is intent on ensuring that intelligence provided to policymakers, warfighters, and Congress was and is accurate, unbiased, and timely.